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The Enhancement Bias in Consumer Decisions to Adopt and Utilize Product Innovations
Abstract
The ability of consumers to anticipate the value they will draw from new product
generations that expand the capabilities of incumbent goods is explored. Drawing on previous
research in affective forecasting, the work explores a hypothesis that consumers will frequently
overestimate the benefits they envision drawing from new added product features and
underestimate the learning costs required to realize those benefits. This hypothesis is tested using
a computer simulation in which subjects are trained to play a Pacman-like arcade game where
icons are moved over a screen by different forms of tactile controls. Respondents are then given
the option to play a series of games for money with an incumbent game platform or pay to play
with an alternative version that offer either expanded (Experiments 1 and 2) or simplified
(Experiment 3) sets of controls. As hypothesized, subjects displayed an upwardly-biased
valuation of the new sets of controls as measured by actual versus forecasted usage rates and
performance gains. Yet, when given the opportunity to be paid to trade down to a more efficient
device in exchange, few accepted. We thus observe a paradox where the presence of forecasting
mistakes in product adoptions does little to induce regret in ownership.
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According to a 2003 Harris Poll, 45% of American cell phone owners have never used
voice mail, and 50% have never exercised the option to set their phones to silent or vibrate1. Yet,
we suspect that few of these same decision makers would have considered buying a phone that
did not have these functions. This apparent paradox illustrates what we call the enhancement
bias in new product adoption decisions: given the opportunity to purchase new generations of an
existing product with more bells and whistles, consumers may display an eagerness to adopt that
goes beyond that which could be reasonably justified by their later utilization of these features
and the real increase in happiness they yield.
Although consumer evaluation of product innovations and their adoption behavior has
long been one of the focal topics in consumer and marketing research (see, e.g., Gatignon and
Robertson 1991), to our knowledge the paradox of buying and usage described above has not
been empirically examined. The purpose of this paper is to undertake such an investigation,
exploring biases that arise when consumers who are trained to use one generation of products are
given the opportunity to purchase and utilize an enhanced generation that enriches the way that
the product can be utilized.
Our central thesis is that when exposed to new products that offer enhanced features
consumers will over-project the degree to which their initial positive reactions will hold in the
future, a bias similar to that which has been observed in other domains of affective forecasting
(e.g., Loewenstein and Schkade 1999; Wilson and Gilbert 2003). This bias is fostered by a
tendency to insufficiently project the contrary likelihood that future usage and pleasure will be
suppressed by factors such as learning costs (e.g., Johnson, Bell, and Lhose 2003; Mukherjee and
Hoyer 2001; Zauberman 2003). The consequence is a systematic bias in which consumers are
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attracted to new product generations by the allure of innovative features, but then under-utilize
them after adoption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first provide a more formal
description of the innovation adoption problem that forms the focus of our work. We then review
prior literature on how it might be solved by consumers and draw hypotheses about how actual
decisions may depart from the normative solution. We then report the results of three
experiments that test these hypotheses. We conclude with a general discussion of the
implications of this work for both basic research in consumer response to new technologies as
well applied work in new-product design.
Normative and Descriptive Elements of New-Product Adoption Decisions
In this work we consider how consumers solve a class of new-product adoption problems
with the following structure. A consumer currently owns a durable good that conveys utility
through the utilization of a set of features (such as options in software or capabilities of a home
entertainment device). A manufacturer offers the consumer the opportunity to purchase an
enhanced version that retains the features of the old but adds a new set of discrete attributes of
uncertain value. The existence of these new attributes does not affect the functionality or utility
derived of the older attributes, however, the consumer must choose to use either the new or the
old features at any given point in time. Analogous cases include software packages that provide
users with the option to utilize either older or newer interfaces (similar he to Windows XP), or
digital cameras that give users the option to operate it with a basic set of automatic settings or a
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more advanced set of customized settings. In addition, we assume that the product will be
privately consumed, excluding social-conformity considerations in the adoption decision.2
This problem and its normative solution can be more formally stated as follows. For
simplicity assume that the utility from consuming an incumbent good with an attribute set α at
any point in time t is scaled to be 0. Let d t ∈ {0,1} denote the consumer’s decision whether or not
to utilize some new feature set δ given its ownership at time t, let xt = u (δ ) t − c(δ ) t be the net
utility that is realized from a decision to utilize δ at t where c(δ)t is a single-period usage or
learning cost. Let zt denote the consumer’s beliefs about the probability distribution associated
with xt3. In addition, let π T = d 0 ,...d T be a sequence of attribute-usage decisions defined over a
T-period ownership horizon, and let V0 (π t ) be the total discounted expected utility implied by
this sequence, defined as follows:
V0 (π T ) = E 0 ∑t =0 β t v( xt , z t , d t ) , 0<β<1
T

(1)

where β is the discount factor. If a consumer were to optimally solve this problem, he or she
would first try to find that sequential usage policy π T* that maximizes expression (1), yielding an
optimal ownership valuation ( V * = V0 (π T | π T* ) ). The consumer would then buy the innovation

if it were offered at a price less than V* (the expected lifetime value of the new features).
The Nature of Intuitive Solutions

Consumers, of course, would be unlikely to make new-product adoption decisions as
described above. To apply the normative solution the consumer would need to possess good
2

In some cases consumers may buy enhanced versions of new products not because its features are assumed to
convey benefits but because of desires to achieve social conformity. While real, the influence of such considerations
is not taken up in this work.
3
In a standard analysis these beliefs would be assumed to evolve as a Markov process given decision to utilize δ;
that is, associated with zt is a first-order cumulative conditional distribution function G(z’,z).
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skills not only in intuitive dynamic programming (to derive the optimal ownership policy π T* ),
but also hedonic and utilitarian forecasting—accurately anticipating the various possible states of
long-term pleasure one might come to associate with a new technology (the distribution over net
asymptotic values of u(δ)-c(δ)) as well as the sequence of utilization decisions one will take in
the future ( π T ). While the literature is replete with examples of intuitive decisions that closely
correspond with those prescribed by highly complex normative models (e.g. Hogarth 1981;
Meyer and Hutchinson, 2001), this same robustness may not extend to intuitive forecasting. We
will briefly review lines of evidence suggesting systematic biases that may arise when consumers
attempt to develop two kinds of forecasts central to the above normative solution: 1) forecasts of
the mean potential value of an innovative attribute (beliefs about x and z); and 2) forecasts of the
dynamic utilization of the new attribute (beliefs about the decision policy πT).
Intuitive forecasts of new attribute values: what’s a deluxe widget worth?

Few would contest the suggestion that new products often have intrinsic appeal. New
rides at amusement parks have the longest lines, movies have their greatest attendance on the
weekend of first release, and we are lured by new flavors in ice cream shops. In some of these
instances, of course, the allure of novelty has a rational basis: one should try new options
because doing so provides information about product quality that can be exploited in future
choices. Yet there is also evidence that the appeal of novelty often goes beyond what which can
be explained by rational curiosity alone. Miller and Kahn (2003), for example, show that merely
affixing novel names to the color or flavor of an otherwise familiar product can enhance its
predicted quality among consumers. They explain this finding as arising from conversational
norms (Grice 1975): consumers have simply come to associate novel names and appearances as
the means by which firms communicate superior quality in markets.
5

In the current case positive reactions to a new-product generation would be further
enhanced by the fact that there is a tangible basis for appeal aside from sheer novelty: that
accruing to the expanded set of capabilities offered by the innovation. Even if the consumer
were unsure whether these new product features enhanced value, there still might be rational
reason for acquiring it. Specifically, expression (1) implies that the normative value of a novel
attribute is not simply the consumer’s best guess about future utility applied over a time horizon,
but rather its option value over that horizon. That is, the expected long-term valuation drawn by a
consumer who discovers a new attribute’s value, and then uses this knowledge to make an
optimal series of day-to-day decisions about whether or not to use it. Hence, a rational consumer
who sees little merit in owning a new attribute in the short run might nevertheless be prescribed
to acquire it simply to exploit the chance that it will prove valuable later.
There is considerable evidence suggesting that not only will consumers be attracted to
alternatives that offer option values, but that this attraction might exceed that prescribed by
rational analysis. To illustrate, Shin and Ariely (2003) report data from a sequential search task
in which people are willing to pay to keep search options open even when the odds of their being
utilized later is negligible—a result consistent with the strong preference that decision makers
display for revocability observed by Gilbert and Ebert (2002). Likewise, Simonson (1990) and
Loewenstein and Adler (1996) document a diversification bias whereby people choose a wider
assortment of products when deciding now for the future compared to the assortment that they
actually choose when decisions are made individually over time. A natural extension of this
research is that consumers will be particularly attracted to new products that offer flexibility in
the set of attributes that define their use—flexibility that provides an escape hatch in the event
new attributes prove less valuable than was first envisioned.
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Yet, while consumers may find themselves strongly attracted to the prospect of enhanced
new product generations at the outset, it is by no means foregone that this visceral reaction will
translate to a positive adoption decision. As suggested by Mukherjee and Hoyer (2001), this
appeal can vanish if consumers contemplate the more negative realities of ownership, such as
recalling that the joys of new ownership often wear off quickly, and that learning to utilize new
features can be costly and frustrating.
Will these contrary considerations offset positive initial assessment biases? We suggest
that in most cases it will not. The first basis is the large body evidence showing that while
decision makers are generally correct about the valence of future affective states (i.e., whether
one will feel happy or unhappy in the future), they tend to over-project the magnitude and
duration of these feelings in forecasts (the impact bias described by Gilbert et. al (1998); Wilson
and Gilbert (2003)). Applied to the context of product innovations, the implication is that
consumers who have a positive initial reaction to a new product will overly over-project this
sense of affect when forecasting the utility that the good will yield in the distant future.
Why does over-prediction occur? While several mechanisms have been proposed (e.g.,
the anchor-and-adjustment process hypothesized by Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003),
most center on the idea strong affective reactions to a primary event inhibit our ability to process
cues that are incongruent with that affect—a bias that Wilson and Gilbert’s (2003) term focalism.
In principle, of course, a consumer who is considering acquiring a new product should be just as
inclined to contemplate the reasons why it should not be bought as the reasons why it should.
Yet, focalism predicts that anticipatory reasoning will not be balanced; if a consumer’s initial
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reaction to a new product is positive, it will be much easier to imagine future product use in a
way that is consistent with this prior than inconsistent —hence an over-projection of value.4
In addition, even if consumers were to try to objectively consider the learning costs of
adoption, the predicted size of these costs may be downwardly biased by recency effects in
memory (e.g., Kahneman 1999). Recall that the greatest costs of learning to use a new tool or
device are typically incurred during the early days of ownership, when the power-law of
achievement will be its steepest (Johnson, Bell, and Lhose 2003). Once consumers become
familiar with use, however, memories of these early costs will likely become less salient as
perception become dominated by more recent, more pleasurable, usage experiences (e.g., Soman
2003). Hence, in the same way that it may be difficult to fully recall how difficult it was to learn
to drive, consumers who try to attempt to anticipate the learning costs that will be associated
with a new product generation may be prone to underestimate them.
Taken together, the converging evidence reviewed above leads to the following
hypothesis:
H1: The enhancement bias. When given the opportunity to purchase a new product that

possesses an expanded set of features relative to the incumbent, consumers will overvalue
the new product, revealing rates of adoption and levels of willingness-to-pay in excess of
those that would be justified by both actual and subsequent utilization patterns and a
rational a priori options valuation.

4

The selective processing argument may also help resolve the apparent inconsistency between our argument and the
well-known tendency for consumers to overweight out-of-pocket (purchase) costs relative to opportunity costs, since
owning the new features is a form of opportunity (e.g., Thaler 1980). Our argument suggests that, though
underweighting opportunity costs may be a general tendency, it may not hold true when other forms of cognitive
biases are activated and point to a different direction. In our case, we argue that the strong affective component and
the resultant selective processing may overcome the tendency to overweight out-of-pocket costs.
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While H1 predicts a global tendency to overvalue product enhancements, there will
clearly be individual and contextual variations in the degree to which this will hold. To illustrate,
Mukherjee and Hoyer (2001) offer data suggesting that if novel features are added to a product
that is already perceived as complex and difficult to use, this enhancement bias may be muted by
the greater salience of learning costs. Hence, the magnitude of the bias will likely differ
depending on the quality of a consumer’s experience with the adoption and use of the current
generation of a product. Formally,
H1a: The moderating effect of prior experiences: the mean tendency of consumers to

overvalue product enhancements will be moderated by the experienced utility and
learning costs associated the incumbent product.
Now that they’ve bought it, will they use it?

After consumers purchase a new product normative theory prescribes that they should
experiment with its new features to determine their true value as early as possible and make the
appropriate switch-or-stick decision based on the outcome of their experimentation. However,
there are reasons to suspect that this will not occur. After paying for new features consumers
may be prone to prematurely abandon experimentation and subsequent utilization, limiting the
potential utility they might otherwise draw from the acquisition.
One reason for this was suggested above: when making purchasing decisions consumers
will tend to excessively focus on the imagined future benefits of an innovation’s new features,
and under-attend to learning costs that will later be required to realize them. When these costs
are finally observed they may suppress usage for the rational reason that they are now accurately
seen as being greater than the benefits that learning a new attribute could provide.
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We suggest, however, that the actual degree of suppression will be even greater than that
which would be predicted by such a rational re-assessment. The rationale is as follows. Unlike a
one-time adoption decision, decisions about whether to utilize a new feature are frequent and
recurrent; during the course of ownership one is making a continuous series of decisions whether
to use familiar incumbent features with a known payoff versus a new features with both an
uncertain payoff and, possibly, a trial cost. This dynamic nature of feature utilization brings to
the table two new task elements that may degrade decision making: the need to see long-run
benefits in incurring short-run costs, and the ability to defer experimentation.
A review of the substantial body of research on dynamic decision making strongly
supports a conclusion that human decision makers are myopic, overweighing short-term
consequences at the expense of long-term consequences (see, e.g. Hutchinson and Meyer 1994;
Herenstein and Prelec 1991). Of particular relevance is work that has studied the ability of
decision makers to solve “armed bandit” problems that involve a similar recurrent choice
between an option that yields a reward with known probability versus another whose probability
must be discovered through experimentation (e.g., Banks, Olson, and Porter 1997; Meyer and
Shi 1995). A consistent finding of this work is that subjects abort experimentation too early
when they encounter negative feedback, consistent with a tendency to view future consequences
over too short a time horizon (e.g., Meyer and Shi 1995). Applied to the current task, this work
would predict a similar inclination among consumers to prematurely abandon the learning of
new product features when the benefits are not immediately realized, or if learning costs prove
higher than expected.
This base aversion for experimentation may then be exacerbated by the omnipresent
ability to defer the start of learning. Specifically, when a consumer acquires a good there is
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obviously no mandatory time at which they must start learning; a consumer may prefer to “ease
in” to the new product generation by first using the more familiar features, then gradually learn
to use the newer ones. The evidence from work that has examined how individuals make
deferral decisions, however, suggests that the onset of learning may be delayed longer than
normative theory would prescribe, and indeed may never begin at all (Dhar 1997; Tversky and
Shafir 1992). Excessive deferral can be seen as a temporal extension of the well-known statusquo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhasuer 1988): given a choice between undertaking a risky, costly,
action (learning a new feature) versus postponing the action for the moment and accepting a
satisfactory status quo (using a familiar feature), there will be an inherent local preference for the
latter. A myopic consumer might then be prone to repeatedly make this same decision, never
realizing that doing so precludes them from realizing the higher long-run utility that motivated
the purchase of the enhanced product generation in the first place.
Thus, the combination of myopia and propensity for deferral predicts that consumers will
under-utilize the new features once they have them in their possession. We state the prediction
as the following hypothesis:
H2: The Under-Utilization Bias. Given a decision to acquire an innovation that

possesses a mixture of innovative and familiar attributes, utilization of the new attributes
will fall short of the levels implied by stated wiliness-to-pay for the good, direct forecasts
of benefits, and objective benefits that would come from optimal usage.
We might note that the processes that are theorized to lead to overvaluation of newproduct generations and subsequent underutilization imply a possible paradox in how individual
differences in post-purchase attribute utilization might relate to pre-purchase willingness to pay.
In H1a we proposed that consumers who had more positive experiences when consuming past
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technologies would produce the most optimistic assessments of the prospective value of a new
product that offered an attribute innovation. Yet, because much of this optimism comes from the
under-forecasting of learning and switching costs (as above), it is these same consumers who
would most likely experience the greatest disappointment when they come to utilize attribute
innovation that they paid for. This disappointment, in turn, could lead to more rapid decisions to
abandon the use of the new attributes relative to those who entered ownership with more modest
expectations. We summarize this idea in the following hypothesis:
H2a The Paradox of the Technological Optimist: Consumers who reveal the greatest

optimism in their willingness to pay for a technological innovation will also be the most
prone to abandon trial usage of attribute innovations given ownership.
Remark: why would usage predictions not be self-fulfilling? Before we turn to the

empirical evidence bearing on H1 and H2 a natural question might arise: why would consumer
decisions about new attribute utilization not be subject to sunk-cost effects, hence at least be
somewhat self-fulfilling? There is, of course, evidence that when consumers undertake monetary
investments they often subsequently behave in a way that would serve to mentally justify that
investment (e.g., Thaler 1980). In the current context one might hypothesize that adopters of
new technologies will make a point of using its innovative features simply to justify the
acquisition.
Yet, work that has examined the effect of investment commitments on behavior over time
suggests that if adopters of technology are influenced by sunk-cost effects, the effect is likely to
be short-lived. Of direct relevance are the works by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2002) and
Gourville and Soman (1998) who have looked at over-time consumption behavior for
subscription events such as health-club memberships. The consistent finding is that consumers
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systematically over-predict the degree to which they will utilize subscriptions as implied by the
size of their initial investment; while usage is invariably initially high (perhaps fostered by sunkcost effects), subsequent compliance often rapidly falls. What is particularly telling about these
examples is that these are instances where consumers make heavy up-front investments in the
hope that it will encourage compliance—yet we still see an over-forecast of usage. Once again,
the most likely explanation is that as consumers we seem to have difficulty projecting how we
will utilize products prior to actual ownership, with prior assessments biased upwards by the
positive emotions that motivate the initial purchase (e.g., a sudden desire to become fit).
Empirical Analysis
Overview and Design Consideration

In this section we describe the results of three experiments designed to test the empirical
validity of the research hypotheses summarized in H1, H1a, H2, and H2a, as well as provide
descriptive insights into the process by which consumers make decisions to buy and then
subsequently utilize product innovations. These issues were examined by observing how a
sample of experimental subjects learned to play an original arcade-like computer game where
performance was rewarded by a monetary incentive. After a period of training with one of
several basic platform designs subjects were given the opportunity to purchase an enhanced
platform that offered a combined set of features that were drawn from the basic platforms. In a
third experiment we examine the reciprocal case: subjects trained on the enhanced platform are
given the opportunity to exchange it with a reward for a simplified platform containing only one
type of control.
The game was called “Catch’em” and bore similarities to the popular late 70’s, early 80’s
arcade game Pac Man. In the game players viewed a square grid (Figure 1) on which was
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superimposed a number of stationary green dots called “cookies”. Also on the grid were two
larger red and black dots that depicted the starting position of the player and his or her robotic
opponent, termed the “Monster”. Upon triggering the start of the game both the Monster’s and
player’s icons began moving over the grid. While the Monster moved at a random speed and
direction, the player controlled the speed and direction of his or her icon. Each time either the
player’s icon (or the Monster) moved over a cookie a point was scored for the player (or the
Monster). If all of the cookies were consumed from the board by the player and/or the Monster,
the play ended and the player received a point total equal to the number of cookies he or she had
captured. If, however, at any point the Monster’s icon touched the player’s icon, the player’s
icon was declared “caught” and play also ended, with all points having been earned from that
play being forfeited.
We chose this—admittedly unusual—stimulus context because it was one that satisfied
four ideal design criteria:
1. It provided us with experimental control over the design and familiarity subjects had
with a basic generation of a technology;
2. It allowed experimental introduction over the value of enhanced features in a new
technology;
3. It provided a natural objective for measuring performance that could be used for
providing a monetary incentive to subjects; and
4. The task context—an arcade game—was one that was likely to be seen as highly
involving and familiar to the subject pool, primarily undergraduate college students.
The technology in this case was the nature, complexity, and quality of the controls available to
subjects for moving their icon. A basic technology was one where subjects had access to only
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one kind of control at one calibrated level of performance, while the enhanced technology was
one where subjects had access to multiple controls—both those with which they were familiar
and a “new” set that was derived from one of the other basic models (the existence of which was
unknown to subjects).
Our analysis focuses on the results of three experiments conducted within this paradigm.
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to conduct a basic test of the four hypotheses in a setting
where there was minimal measurement intervention; we observed learning paths, the dynamics
of control utilization, and adoption decisions in the absence of direct elicitations of either
forecasts of behavior or elicitations of reasons for decisions—interventions that might influence
behavior. In Experiment 2 we attempt to more deeply probe the process that underlies the data
uncovered in Experiment 1 by gathering process measures. In Experiment 3 we examine the
degree to which decisions to upgrade were drawn more by global preferences for expanded
controls versus mistaken forecasts about usage by studying preferences for simplified platforms
among those trained on multiple controls.
Experiment 1
Design, Subjects, and Procedure

Subjects were 138 business-school undergraduates who volunteered to complete the task
for a monetary incentive. Subjects performed the experiment seated in computer cubicles in the
school’s behavioral research lab. At the outset of the experiment subjects were told that the
purpose of the experiment was to learn how consumers such as themselves learned to play
gaming devices, and that they would be paid depending on their performance in the game.
Subjects were told that there would be a show-up fee of $5 (US) per subject, and they could earn
up to $10 more depending on how well they learned to play the game.
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All subjects were told that they would be playing the “Catch’em” game a total of 30
times, with the first 15 being practice rounds that would not count toward their final earnings,
and the second 15 being money rounds on which their pay would be based. After reading this
basic instruction subjects were randomly assigned to either a control or treatment condition, with
which they were also assigned to play one of three different basic game platforms (described
below). Subjects in the control condition played with the same platform over all 30 rounds of the
experiment. Subjects in treatment condition played the first 15 training rounds with one platform,
but were then given the opportunity to pay to play the money rounds with a new platform that
offered a broader range of controls. The opportunity to pay to switch to a new platform was
offered only once; if a subject declined the purchase he or she played the 15 money rounds with
the same game platform that they trained on, the same as those in the control condition.
The game platforms. The three basic game platforms on which subjects trained were

defined by the physical form and reliability of the controls used to move the player’s icon. There
were three mechanisms:
1. A Scroll Bar Control (henceforth scroll bars version; Figure 1a): Subjects
continuously adjusted the speed and direction of movement of their icon by moving
each of two horizontal scroll bars displayed on the computer screen. Use of the
directional control was aided by a steering-wheel-like graphic that displayed the
current directional heading of the icon.
2. A Button Control with high reliability (henceforth good buttons version; Figure 1b).
Subjects adjusted speed and direction by repeatedly clicking two sets of button
controls. One pair of buttons allowed subjects to reverse the current heading of their
icon either horizontally or vertically, while the other set induced discrete increases or
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decreases in speed. High reliability meant that the icon’s movement responded 80%
of the times to player actions in the intended manner given activation of any control.
3. A Button Control with low reliability (henceforth bad buttons version; Figure 1b).
The appearance and function of this platform was identical to (2), except that random
noise was added to the responsiveness of controls. Specifically, given activation of a
given control there was a 60% chance that it would momentarily fail, resulting in no
change in movement of the icon.
In Figure 2 we plot the average performance attained by subjects using each of these
control formats during the training rounds. The figure yields an important feature of this training
manipulation: in addition to varying the tactile experience with controls that subjects had
entering the money rounds, the three control conditions also manipulated the qualitative nature of
their learning experience. Specifically, subjects found the button controls to be a more natural
way of moving the icon than the scroll bars, and when the buttons were reliable they realized
high levels of performance after a short period of familiarization. For subjects given the scrollbar control, however, their learning experience was quite different: while they ultimately
developed the same level of skill as those displayed by subjects who trained on the reliable
buttons (as measured by average realized scores) this achievement was achieved only after they
incurred more substantial learning costs as evidenced by the low average scores realized at the
outset of training. Finally, subjects who trained on the low-reliability buttons would have found
the training rounds to be a far more frustrating experience; while there was tactile ease in using
the buttons, they would have experienced little improvement in achievement over time
movement was inherently difficult to control.
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The enhanced platform. The central interest in the experiment was how subjects in the

treatment groups responded to the opportunity to play their money rounds of the game with a
new platform that offered an expanded set of controls. This version--called the combo
platform—provided subjects with access to both sets of controls that appeared in the basic
platforms: buttons as well as scroll bars (Figure 1c). Note that since subjects trained on only
one kind of control and were unaware of the existence of the other, the added controls that
appeared on the combo version represented an innovation: the scroll bars would have been novel
to those who trained on buttons, and the buttons novel to those who trained on scroll bars.
To insure that the locus of perceived benefits of the combo platform would be isolated to
the new control, the function and reliability of the more familiar controls was identical to that
which subjects had experienced during the training rounds. Hence, the reliability of the button
controls in the combo platform was low for those who trained on low-reliability buttons and high
for those who trained on high-reliability buttons. For subjects who trained on the scroll bar, the
new button controls were of moderate reliability. In addition, the physical appearance of the
combo platform was identical to that of each of the basic platforms with the exception of the
presence of a second set of controls (Figure 1c).
It should be observed that the design implied that the objective incremental value of the
new combo platform thus varied depending on the platform on which subjects trained initially.
For subjects who trained on the low-reliability buttons the combo platform subjects access to a
more reliable control (the scroll bars) that could potentially allow them to realize significantly
higher scores in the money rounds. For subjects who trained on the scroll bars or the highreliability buttons the objective advantage of the combo version was simply tactile flexibility;
since both controls yielded comparable asymptotic levels of achievement (see Figure 2), higher
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mean achievement mean could be expected only if subjects differed in their natural aptitude for
each of the two controls, and made optimal self-selection decisions upon ownership. Of course,
subjects could only discover these comparative benefits if they chose to purchase the combo
platform and then experimented with the performance of the new control.
The pricing and purchase mechanism. After completing the training phase of the game

subjects in the control groups moved on to the money rounds of the game, while those in the
treatment condition read a mock news announcement that a new version had been developed
which they had the opportunity to purchase for play during the money rounds rather than the
platform they trained on. Subjects were given an illustration of what the new game platform
looked like. It was emphasized that the more familiar controls would function just like the old
ones did, and no statement was made about whether the new control would yield better or worse
game results than the old one; subjects were told that the new controls simply gave them greater
flexibility in how they controlled their icon.
After reading this announcement subjects were then told that they could acquire the new
platform by paying a point handicap that would be applied to their realized score in the money
round. Before being shown what this price would be, however, they would have to indicate the
maximum price that they would be willing to pay for the game, and they will obtain it if the
actual price turns out to be less than this value—an elicitation procedure akin to that suggested
by Becker, de Groot, and Marschak (1964; BDM). To insure that subjects fully understood how
the process would work subjects first participated in a practice round where they set a WTP price
for a movie ticket and an illustrative actual price was drawn by lottery. Subjects were given the
opportunity to repeat this exercise until they felt comfortable with the procedure.
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The actual price of the combo game was held constant for all subjects at 120 points, a
price at which subjects would break even if the new game allowed them to realize a modest (8
point-per-game) increase in performance over the incumbent platform. This price thus implied
that subjects who saw the prospect of either only nominal or no improvements in performance
with combo platform would play the money rounds with their existing game, whereas subjects
with more optimistic estimates would play with the combo game. After subjects submitted
WTPs, those who submitted valuations greater than 120 were informed that they would be
playing with the combo platform, and the purchase price was immediately reflected as a negative
number in the cumulative score box on their game screen (see Figure 1c).
Results

Among the 68 subjects in the treatment condition who were given the opportunity to
purchase the new game platform, 57 (84%) provided willingness-to-pay levels that were
sufficient to attain ownership of the combo platform (valuations greater than 120). Hence, on the
whole subjects were quite optimistic about the score improvement they could potentially realize
by playing the version. A subsequent analysis of the performance of the 11 non-adopters during
the money rounds revealed a pattern of achievement similar to that observed among those in the
control condition, hence these two groups were pooled in subsequent analyses.
The efficiency of adoption decisions. Subjects’ stated willingness to pay for the new

platform is, of course, an implicit forecast of how having the ability to use a second control will
improve their score beyond that which could be realized by the basic platform. Since the raw
measure of WTPs is highly skewed, we utilize and report log-transformed WTPs in all
subsequent analyses unless otherwise noticed. In Figure 3 we plot the mean WTP for each initial
platform (Figure 3a) and the mean WTP of subjects who adopted the innovation by training
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condition relative to two standards of achievement (Figure 3b): the improvement in scores they
actually realized relative to that realized over the last 6 games of the training round, and the
improvement relative to the scores realized by control subjects who did not upgrade. The figure
yields two insights that suggest initial support for H1 and H1a:
1. Excessive mean optimism in the projected benefits a new control. The mean stated
WTP for the new platform across training conditions was 341 game points (SD=232,
median = 300), equivalent to an expectation that having access to a second control
would allow them to realize a 20% (SD=14%) improvement in score over retaining
the basic platform. These implicit forecasts, however, turned out to be quite poor: on
average subjects who bought the new platform (henceforth “adopters”) did not
perform better than those who never upgraded. In addition, the mean WTP was not
lower than the average increase in raw score by control subjects (mean WTP = 401
[median 375] versus the mean performance increase of 443 [median 385], p>.6).
Moreover, WTP was negatively correlated with raw increase in total score (r= -.36,
p<.001).
2. The optimism bias was conditioned by the training platform. By visual inspection,
Figure 3a offers some initial support to H1a. That is, those starting with highreliability buttons which offered the least frustrating experience also tended to give
higher WTPs for the new platform than those starting with the more difficult scrollbar platform (mean=388 for high-reliability buttons and 298 for scroll-bar,
median=400 and 250, respectively).
To more rigorously explore the effect of training experience on WTPs, we modeled
individual estimates as a function of the initial platform and subjects’ experience during the
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training period (we used the maximum score over the last six games during training rounds
[MAX6] as the proxy for experienced ease of learning). The regression results are presented in
Table 1. It is clear that, in support of H1a, both factors contributed significantly to stated WTPs.
Specifically, subjects who trained on either button platform stated significantly higher WTPs for
the new platform than did those who trained on the scroll bar platform, presumably as a result of
their better experience with the game in training rounds. In addition, WTPs were positively
related to the experienced ease of learning (p<.02). Notice that our proxy for experienced ease of
learning (MAX6) incorporates the recency bias in retrospective evaluations.
To more directly examine the degree to which subjects were able to anticipate their actual
performance using the combo platform we modeled each player’s cumulative score during the
money rounds as a function of their average score in the training rounds, their WTPs for the
combo game, and gender (see Table 2). The data yield a surprising result: after controlling for
training performance, the marginal effect of increasing statements of WTP was negative (t(1,63)=
-3.33; p=.0014) among those who purchased the new platform5. In short, at the margin those
with the most optimistic estimate of how well they would do in the money rounds tended to have
the lowest actual achievements.
Additional insight into why subjects who acquired the new platform may have
underperformed relative to their WTPs is contained in Figure 4, which plots performance over all
30 trials for treatment versus control subjects by training condition. The figure suggests one
contributing explanation for the exaggerated WTP estimates: while subjects who bought the new
platform seem to have correctly anticipated that their performance would improve on the money
trials playing with the new platform, they failed to foresee two factors that would also naturally
mitigate achievable relative performance:
5

Excluding those who chose not to upgrade did not change the conclusion.
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1. The fact that there would also be improvements in skill levels playing with the basic
platform; and
2. Any potential incremental benefits of the combo version would not be immediately
realized as control usage would likely alternate, at least initially, between the two
options.
In short, it is as if the WTP estimates reflected a comparison of an envisioned asymptotic value
of the combo platform to the current value of the basic platform—a comparison that naively
overlooks the dynamics that would govern actual relative performance during the money period
but is consistent with the projection and impact biases we discusses earlier.
Feature utilization. It should be emphasized, of course, that the conclusion of

overstated WTPs exploits the hindsight knowledge that was not in evidence at the time subjects
made these assessments: the objective incremental value of the added control option. Recalling
the principles of rational product adoption we discussed at the start, the apparent overvaluation
of the combo device might simply be seen as the case of rational investments in an experiment
that did not pay off. That is, subjects who purchased the innovation ended up achieving levels of
performance similar to those who did not simply because they discovered, after experimentation,
that there was no added value.
In H2 and H2a, however, we hypothesize that while subjects may well acquire the combo
platform with well-meaning intentions to learn about its value, its new features will be
underutilized, even in settings where there would be a real normative gain. In the current
experiment such is the case of subjects who trained on the low-reliability button control. For
these subjects the new availability of the scroll bar offered a very real opportunity to increase
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earnings, though it would require them to incur a period of learning with a control that they are
likely initially to find unnatural.
In Figure 5 we plot the relative frequency with which subjects in each of the training
conditions used their new control in combo platform over trials. For subjects who were trained
on either reliable buttons or scrolls bars (the dashed lines in Figure 5) the data give strong
apparent support for H2: although subjects paid a substantial amount—and were prepared to pay
more—for the ability to at least experiment with the use of the new control, few made use of this
opportunity. Specifically, during the initial three games (block 6 in Figure 5) of the money
period, when utilization of the novel control should rationally have been quite high, subjects who
had trained on the high-reliability buttons and the scroll bar utilized the new (reciprocal) control
on average only 21% of the time, a level that diminished over time thereafter. In addition—and
perhaps shockingly—the data revealed 8 subjects in these two conditions who never utilized the
new controls at all over the entire 15 games, yet their WTP were no less than that of others
(mean=396 and median=342, p>.9).
Perhaps the most compelling evidence favoring H2 is the level of scroll-bar usage
displayed by subjects who had trained on the low-reliability button (the solid line in Figure 5).
On one hand, unlike those who had positive experiences in the training rounds, here we see
subjects display a much higher rate of initial usage of the scroll bar, though its level (54%) is still
below that which one would normatively prescribe if subjects were active experimenters. In
addition, contrary to the normative recommendation, 3 subjects did not start experimenting with
the new controls at least until after the first 3 games. On the other hand, the more disturbing
feature of the data is that utilization never increased much in the task beyond this level—even
though subject would have clearly benefited if it had. In essence, subjects seemed unable to
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abandon use of a familiar control in favor of a new one, despite the objective superiority of the
latter.
As a final analysis we examined how individual differences in novel attribute utilization
related to subjects’ willingness-to-pay for the combo platform. This relationship is, of course,
normatively positive; since WTP should reflect, in part, the value a subject sees in experimenting
with the new control, the higher the WTP, the more a subject should invest in its usage, at least
until its true value is established. H2b, however, predicts the opposite: because high WTP
measures are theorized to be induced not by rational assessments of the value of information but
rather by projected expectations of high immediate returns from the innovation (H1a), the more
upwardly-biased this assessment, the more likely subjects will be to terminate usage after limited
trials.
To test this hypothesis we estimated two models explaining the proportion of uses of the
novel control for each subject over games: one that modeled usage as a function of stated WTP
for the combo platform, indicator variables for a subject’s training platform, and game trial (both
linear and quadratic functions; Model 1 in Table 3), and another that that modeled usage as a
function of game trial (linear and quadratic terms) and experienced ease of learning (MAX6;
Model 2 in Table 3). The results of these analyses, reported in Table 3, support H2b: rather than
serving to foster new attribute usage, in this case optimistic beliefs serve to suppress it. The
greater the degree to which a subject had positive experiences in the training period (MAX6)
and/or emerged from it with superior expectations about the value of the new attribute (WTP),
the lower the mean utilization. Similar pattern of results still hold if we examine the usage
behaviors in only the first game or first three games.
Experiment 2
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Motivation and Description

While Experiment 1 offers apparent support for the hypothesis of over-estimation of the
value of product innovations, it leaves uncertain the degree to which the revealed levels of WTP
accrued directly to over-forecasts of new control attribute utilization and value versus other
hedonic drivers, such as a simple attraction to novelty. To resolve this issue a second group of
27 subjects were recruited to replicate a version of the study reported in Experiment 1, but with
one major design change. After subjects read the description of the new combo platform and
before the elicitation of their willingness-to-pay they were posed with a series of questions
designed to tap their beliefs of the value of the new platform. Subjects were asked to make four
forecasts:
1. The likely percentage change over all 15 games if they continue to use their existing
platform (positive or negative);
2. The likely percentage change over all 15 games if they switch to the new platform
(positive or negative);
3. The likely percentage change in their score over the first three games compared to
that which would be realized using the basic platform (positive or negative); and
4. The percentage of time during the first three games of the money rounds that they
would likely utilize the new control offered by the new platform.
All forecasts were provided by checking a box on a discrete category scale that offered a range
of possible percentage responses.
In addition, after WTP measures were elicited and the mock lottery was run, subjects who
received the new combo platform were asked an additional series of questions designed to elicit
their reasons for setting their WTP levels as they did. These took the form of a series of bipolar-
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scaled question asking for the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with a set of possible
motivations for wanting to acquire the combo platform, including expected performance
increases, flexibility, aesthetics, and a desire for a change of pace.
Because of the limited size of the subject pool only one (rather than three) trainingplatform conditions was replicated: the high-reliability button—the condition where the
optimism bias was most acute in Experiment 1.
Results

Mirroring the results of Experiment 1, subjects revealed a high willingness-to-pay (mean
raw WTPs = 366, SD=248, median=385) for the new game platform, with 100% of subjects
adopting the new platform given the mock-lottery price. The WTPs were not different from those
in Experiment 1 (p>.6). In Table 4 we report a comparison of how their actual performance and
new-control utilization compared to the forecasts. The data suggest that the over-forecasts of
performance and utilization provide at best a partial explanation for their high levels of
willingness-to-pay. Specifically,
1. Subjects did not show excessively optimistic forecasts of their performance with the
new platform; in fact, the overall trend is that of an under-forecast relative to the
benchmark of last six games during training rounds, especially for cumulative
performance over the entire money rounds. On average, the forecast percentage
improvement in performance with the existing platform roughly corresponded to the
actual percentage change by control groups in Experiment 1 (p>.3). Their mean
actual performance in the money rounds was 2241 (SD=713), comparable to that of
the control group in Experiment 1 (mean = 2336, SD=862); but
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2. Subjects severely over-forecasted the degree to which they would be utilizing the new
control; while the average forecast rate during the first three games was 50%, actual
usage was closer to 20% in the first three games. On average they used the new
controls only about 10% over all 15 games.
Since subjects provided performance forecasts for both the incumbent and new platforms,
these estimates can be used to derive normative implied WTPs: estimates of what these
assessments should have been had they been based solely on their comparative performance
forecasts; that is, the forecast performance for the new platform minus that for the incumbent. In
Figure 6 we present a scatter plot of implied versus actual WTPs. The figure yields a striking
result: the absence of a systematic positive relationship between the two constructs. Indeed, the
relationship between the two measures was nominally negative, with nearly 80% of subjects (21
out of 27) stating a higher or equal score forecast for the incumbent platform compared to the
new, resulting in an aggregate mean implied WTP of -154 (SD=360, median = -190). In
contrast, recall that their average stated WTPs revealed only a moment later was significantly
higher (Mean=366, SD=248, median=385; paired test t(26)=5.50, p<.0001). Hence, at the very
least, the data reject the idea that subjects formed assessments of WTP by contrasting forecasts of
the value of the new platform with what this would have been had they stayed with the
incumbent.
What were subjects’ own reasons for being attracted to the new game platform? In Table
5 we summarize the degree to which subjects, on average, agreed or disagreed with each of four
possible reasons for preferring to acquire the combo platform. The data suggest that if hedonic
or boredom-related factors were influencing this decision, subjects were not inclined to admit to
them. Subjects were most inclined to agree that the decisions were motivated by the two factors
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that high WTP valuations should have been based on: expectations of higher performance and a
desire for flexibility. In contrast, subjects were less inclined to agree that attraction was
motivated by the aesthetic appeal of the new platform and nominally disagreed that it was
motivated by task boredom.
One interpretation of the data is thus that approached their assessments of WTP with
normatively-correct beliefs about the factors that should drive these evaluations. Where the WTP
assessments went awry was a tendency to overestimate the degree to which they would utilize
the new control feature (the value of flexibility) and an underestimate the degree to which their
performance would likely improve to a similar degree using the older platform. What is curious
about this latter result is that subjects did reveal such knowledge when directly asked what their
performance would be using the older platform; it was simply not incorporated when WTP
judgments were made.
Experiment 3
Motivation

While the first two experiments offer apparent evidence that respondents placed too high
a value on the opportunity to adopt a platform that offered an enriched set of controls, they do
not conclusively resolve the degree to which the enhancement bias was due to biases in forecasts
or more subjective appeal (such as design sophistication and/or usage flexibility). For example,
one might argue that we would not have seen this bias had subjects been given an ample
opportunity to try out the enhanced platform prior to purchase, when their limited utilization of
all controls would have been transparent. To help resolve this issue we undertook an
investigation of choice behavior in the reciprocal case of Experiments 1 and 2: we examined the
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degree to which subjects who were initially trained on the combo machine would accept point
rewards for trading down to a simpler platform that utilized only one set of controls.
If players found little use in one of the controls during the training rounds, the
opportunity to be compensated for playing a simpler platform should be quite attractive; they
would be receiving a bonus to use a platform whose essential functionality was unchanged.
Hence, if the interest in upgrading we observed in the first experiments accrued primarily to
exaggerated beliefs about the benefits of the new control (from an inability to fully try them out),
we would expect to see high levels of interest in the exchange when subjects had direct
knowledge of benefits. In contrast, if the upgrades were motivated more by less rational sources
of appeal of the combo platform—such as a preference for design sophistication--we should see
a reluctance to enter into such an exchange. This same reluctance might also be exacerbated by
endowment effects (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990); even if the added controls offered by
the combo platform are found to be of only mildly positive value, decision makers may be
reluctant to part with them by the mere fact that they are currently possessed.
Design, Subjects, and Procedure

205 undergraduate business majors participated for partial class credit and for a monetary
incentive. The basic structure of the experiment mirrored that described in experiments 1 and 2
but in reverse; here all subjects played the training rounds with the combo platform, and were
then given the opportunity to play the money rounds with a simplified platform that utilized only
one set of controls. In addition, rather than eliciting WTP measures for the new platforms, in this
case willingness-to-accept (WTA) measures were elicited: after the training rounds subjects were
told that they would be given a point bonus if they were willing to play the money rounds with a
simplified device. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two trade-down conditions: one
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where the simplified platform used only scroll-bar controls, and one offering only button controls.
In addition, to provide a second measure of control use, after completing the training rounds
subjects were asked to indicate which of the two sets of controls they found most useful in
play—a measure that turned out to correlate quite highly with actual usage.
The WTA measures were elicited by a modified BDM procedure mirroring that used in
Experiments 1 and 2. In this case the actual acceptance threshold was set at 300 points, slightly
more than twice the threshold value used in the WTP lotteries in Experiments 1 and 2. This
threshold was such as to compensate the average player for a 20% decrease in performance in the
money rounds playing with a simplified platform---a highly generous level of compensation.
Results

Is there a market for goods that remove unused features from familiar devices? In the
current context the answer is a strong “no”. First, consistent with previous research on both
endowment effects and preferences for flexibility (e.g., Shin and Ariely 2002), on average
subjects were averse to entering into exchanges that would require them to give up one of the
combo game controls. Subjects indicated a mean WTA of 513 (median 500), compared to the
mean of 341 that they were willing to pay to acquire them in the first experiment—a result that
produced 26% successful trade-downs across both platform conditions.
The most interesting aspect of the data, however, centers on those subjects for whom the
new platform contained just the controls that they indicated that they found most useful in the
first experiment. While the opportunity of an exchange should have been quite attractive to such
subjects, most set WTA prices that precluded successful transactions, revealing a mean WTA of
455 (median 500), leading to 31% successful trade-downs. Even more dramatically, even the 38
subjects who never used the control that was being eliminated displayed an aversion for playing
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with a simpler platform, revealing a mean WTA of 409 (median 455), an assessment that led to
39% successful transactions.
The data thus reject the idea that the strong interest that subjects in the first two
experiments displayed in acquiring the combo platform accrued entirely to mistaken forecasts of
the net value of having access to a second control, or a desire for a change-of-pace in the game
interface. Rather, much of the appeal likely rested in a root attraction to the more sophisticated
design and choice of controls that the new platform offered—points of appeal that had little
objective value, but for which subjects were reluctant to give up once they were acquired.
Discussion

One often hears it said that consumers frequently buy more technology than they can
realistically make use of. We compare products by counting the number of features they offer
(often without knowing what they are used for), and feel bad when we discover that our
incumbent devices are no longer state-of-the-art, regardless of how adequately they may be
fulfilling our needs And this apparent bias is by no means limited to consumers; firms as well
have recently been criticized as well for being prone to invest in more material and
programmatic innovations that actually get implemented (Kim, Pae, Han, and Srivastava 2002).
On the other hand, it also seems to be the case that firms who sell technology also worry about
the possibility that consumers may walk away from technologies that are seen as too innovative.
Hence, for example, when releasing Windows XP took pains to insure that its innovation would
be seen by consumers as only modestly different from its old operating systems, to the point of
allowing users the option eliminate new screen views if they wanted (through the “revert to
classic view” command).
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Yet, as pervasive as these observations may be, there has been little prior work that has
formally studied the biases that characterize consumer new-technology adoption and subsequent
usage decisions, and the psychology that may underlie these biases. The goal of this paper was
to take a step toward gaining this knowledge by observing how a individuals made decisions
whether or not to buy a new technology—an improved gaming device—in a laboratory setting
where we could measure both the actual and perceived value of the technology as well as how it
was utilized after purchase, and manipulate the kind of experiences with prior similar
technologies that subjects had coming into the buying decision.
Central to the work was the idea that a general over-buying bias may, in fact, have a
systematic cognitive basis. Drawing on prior work in affective forecasting, we hypothesized that
when buying new technologies consumers will usually have a difficult time anticipating how
they will utilize a product after it is purchased, and will be prone to believe that the benefits of
attribute innovations that are perceived now will project in a simple fashion into the future.
Implicit to this over-forecast is a tendency to underestimate the impact of factors that may likely
serve to diminish usage in the future that are not in evidence now, such as frustration during
learning and satiation. Consequently, there is a tendency for consumers to systematically
evaluate product innovations through rose-colored glasses, imagining that they will have a larger
and more positive impact on the future lives than they most often will likely end up having.
The experimental data reported here provide strong apparent support for this view of new
product valuation. What is notable about the current demonstration is that the evidence for the
optimism bias we report was derived from a context designed to facilitate rational assessments of
innovation value. Specifically, subjects were given a clearly-stated metric by which the
objective value of the innovation would be assessed, there was a direct monetary penalty for
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overstating value (the game innovation was paid for by a point deduction), and the innovation
itself was a purely functional rather than aesthetic one (a new control added to the same graphic
game platform). Yet, subjects still succumbed to the same biases that we suggest may be
pervasive in real markets: a tendency to overvalue prospective innovations, and then underutilize their features upon acquisition, even for the limited purposes of experimentation (e.g., in
the current task 14 out of 84 subjects across the first two experiments who purchased the
innovation never used its added control at all).
A further intriguing aspect of the results is that while these upgrade decisions proved to
be ill-advised in terms of the benefits respondents actually realized from them, few seemed to
regret it; there was no reciprocal rebate market for simplified platforms that allowed players
access to just those controls they found most useful. Hence, respondents were apparently drawn
to the enhanced platform not simply because of an (erroneous) calculation of expected benefits
minus costs, but rather by a battery of affective forces that have a more limited rational basis,
such as a desire to own top-of-the-line, and a pure preference for flexibility in control usage-even when never exploited.
An interesting question is why people do not anticipate the effects of cognitive lock-in at
the time of making forecasts and adoption decisions. The core explanation we offered was
cognitive availability: consumers who are wrapped in the optimistic euphoria of an adoption will
simply find negative associations less available in memory, hence fail to fully incorporate them
in forecasts (the focalism bias). The work of Liberman and Trope (1998), however, suggest a
somewhat different way in which this availability bias may be working. Specifically, recall that
adoption decisions primarily involve consideration of the long-run benefits of acquiring new
features rather than the experiences on specific short-run usage occasions—a distant focus that
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often encourages a desirability bias (Liberman and Trope 1998). In contrast, the utilization
decision is primarily concerned with the short-run decision of whether ones get greater pleasure
from using familiar or unfamiliar attributes—a focus that may trigger a more myopic mindset.
These different temporal frames, once activated, may lead to selective processing of information,
filtering out the information that is inconsistent with the current frame.
Likewise, the observed reluctance to trade down to more efficient platforms might be
driven by factors other than an inherent aversion for abandoning flexibility (e.g., Shin and Ariely
2003). A complementary mechanism may be that found by Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000), who
studied how consumers make decisions to acquire goods that require them to give up on hedonic
features but gain utilitarian ones. They show that when making such decisions consumers are
more reluctant to give up attributes over utilitarian attributes because the former triggers greater
degrees of cognitive elaboration about the consequences of loss. In the current context, owners of
the enhanced platform were reluctant to trade down to a simpler device simply because it was
easier to think of the possible downsides of loosing flexibility (a hedonic attribute) than the
upsides of gaining scoring efficiency (a utilitarian attribute).
Caveats

While the current findings offer support for the hypothesized effects of product
enhancements, care must obviously be taken before presuming that the findings will hold in all
product-adoption settings. First, a quite natural question—one that the current work only begins
to address—is the effect of long-term learning on the enhancement bias. For example, it is
natural to argue that once a consumer recognizes that they have overbought a technology they
will be less inclined to do the same the next time around; i.e., they would become more astute
forecasters of how they really make use of new technologies. The current data, however, offer a
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mixed view of the likelihood that such learning effects would be widely observed in natural
settings. On one hand, consistent with this prediction, subjects who expressed the most
conservative willingness-to-pay for the game innovation were those who experienced the highest
learning costs with the game on which they first trained. On the other hand, Experiment 3
suggests that such effects may be offset by the simple fact that consumers may not see decisions
to buy top-of-the-line goods that are under-utilized as “mistakes”; while there will always be a
market for upgrades, establishing a market for downgrades (for current users of enhanced
products) may be more difficult.
Another important question that might be raised is that the findings of this research seem,
at first blush, to cut against the grain of those who have offered evidence of an undervaluing of
new technology options due to lock-in effects, such as those reported by Johnson, Bell, and
Lhose (2003; in web-site visitation patterns) and Zauberman (2003; in valuations of new search
engines). The current work differs from these efforts, however, in that here we consider the case
of customer valuations of new products that offer separable enhancements to an existing
platform; that is, by buying the new product one does not have to abandon what one has already
learned (i.e., start a new learning curve). Congruent with their findings, we observed that
subjects who developed a strong familiarity with one type of motion control indeed tended to
stick with it even when they paid for the option to use an alternate, and even when the new
control offered an objective normative benefit. The bias we observed is that subjects seemed
unable to anticipate this underutilization when forming initial valuations.
In this same vein, an interesting challenge for future work would be to better identify
situations where consumers systematically undervalue attribute innovations. Recent work by
Mukherjee and Hoyer (2001) suggest such a boundary condition. They offer data showing that
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when an underlying product already has a complex structure adding more novel features can
degrade attractiveness by increasing perceived learning and usage costs. Hence, there is almost
certainly an upper limit to the enhancement effect documented here: added product features
likely increase attractiveness only to a point. Likewise, the current data also show that the appeal
of new attributes will also be conditioned by past experienced learning difficulty (Hypothesis
H1a; Experiment 1).
Finally, an important goal of future work would be to better resolve the psychological
mechanisms that underlie consumer assessments of product novelty. In this work we show that
these assessments are biased in a way that is consistent with biases found in other domains of
hedonic judgment, and for some of the same apparent reasons—for example, failing to anticipate
future reluctance to experiment with the new control. But account is clearly a blunt one; the
actual mechanism by which consumers develop visions of the future through analogical and
other forms of structured reasoning (e.g., Moreau, Lehmann, and Markham 2001) is clearly a
complex one, and more thoroughly understanding it may help better resolve the empirical
boundaries of assessment biases and, possible, their correction.
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Figure 1: The Three Game Platforms

1a: Scroll-Bar Control

1b: Button Control

1c: The Enhanced Platform:
Combined Controls
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Figure 2: Performance over time during training rounds by initial platform (Experiment 1)
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Game trials are reported as blocks of three games.
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4

5

Figure 3: Stated willingness-to-pay for the new combo platform by training platform
(Experiment 1)
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Figure 3a: Mean stated willingness-to-pay by type of training platform for all participants
in the treatment condition
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Figure 3b: Mean stated willingness-to-pay relative to performance increases by adopters
and control group
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Figure 4: Performance over time by initial platform and upgrade decision
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Figure 5: Utilization of new features over time by initial platform
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Notes:
Usage refers to the proportion of time the new features were used. Game trials are reported as
blocks of three games.
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Figure 6: Scatter Plot of Implied and Stated WTPs
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Note:
Implied WTPs were calculated by subtracting the predicted performance with the new combo
platform from the predicted performance for using incumbent platform.
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Table 1: Determinants of stated WTPs

Dependent Variable: Log(WTP)
Variable
Intercept
Initial platform
Bad buttons
Good buttons
MAX6

Parameter
Estimate
3.960

SE
0.494

t-value
8.01

Pr > |t|
<.0001

0.718
0.779
0.005

0.379
0.409
0.002

1.89
1.91
2.14

0.0629
0.0611
0.0364

F(3,63) = 3.82, p<.02
R2 = 0.15
Note:
MAX6 = best score over the last six games during training rounds
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Table 2: Effect of WTP on Subsequent Performance

Dependent variable: Cumulative performance during money rounds
Variable
Intercept
Cumulative performance during
training rounds
a
Gender
Log(WTP)

Parameter
Estimate
1102.58

SE
350.57

t value
3.15

Pr > |t|
0.0025

0.97
-392.00
-169.98

0.14
138.00
51.00

6.85
-2.84
-3.33

<.0001
0.0061
0.0014

F(3,63)=21.57, p<.0001
Adj. R2 = 0.51
Note:
a
1=Female and 0=Male
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Table 3: Determinants of New Control Utilization

Dependent Variable: New control usage

Variable
Intercept
Initial platform
Bad buttons
Good buttons
Log(WTP)
MAX6
Game trial-linear
Game trial-quadratic

Model 1

Model 2

Parameter
Estimate

Parameter
Estimate

0.472 **

0.751 **

0.349 **
-0.113 **
-0.038 *
-0.002 **
-0.0026
0.0008

-0.003
0.001

F(5, 849) =56.90, p<.0001
R2 = 0.25

F(3,851)=41.67, p<.0001
R2 = 0.13

Note:
MAX6 = best score over the last six games during training rounds
* p<.05 ** p<.001
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Table 4: Forecasts of Performance with New Platform and New Control Utilization a

Predicted

Actual

366
(248)

WTP
Performance change over existing
platform implied by WTP

22%
(15.6%)

Performance change over 15 games for
existing platform b

17%
(20.1%)

25% c
(35.1%)

Performance change over 15 games for
new platform b

9%
(18.7%)

32%*
(42.7%)

Performance change over first 3 games
with new platform b

6%
(20.2%)

21%
(101.5%)

New control utilization over first three
games

50%
(9.4%)

24%*
(31.0%)

Notes:
a
The number reported are means with standard deviations in parenthesis (N=27).
b
Percentage change, positive or negative, relative to last six games during training rounds.
c
Mean for the control group in Experiment 1.
* Predicted is significantly different from actual (p<.05).
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Table 5: Self-reported reasons for upgrade

Reason for upgrade

Mean

SD

New controls are useful

0.76 *

1.48

New controls offer flexibility

0.48 *

1.05

New platform is aesthetically more pleasing

0.28

1.24

-0.12

1.59

Desire for a change of pace

Note:
Items use a 7-point scale, anchored by -3 “Disagree a lot” to 3 “Agree a lot.”
* Mean is significantly different from 0, p<.05
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